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In 2004, in the beginning of the first president Lula mandate, a complete regulatory reform of 
electricity was launched.  In 2008, four years after, Brazilian Congress started an investigation of 
the causes of Brazilian relatively high electricity tariffs. The results of the investigation pointed 
out numerous reasons, but failed to identify generation costs as one of the main causes. In this 
paper the analysis done by Congress is broadened addressing the trend in electricity production 
costs. The main conclusions are that the implementation of auctions together with subsidies from 
state enterprises did not reduce future acquisition costs as much as expected, but successfully 
reduced the rhythm of price increases. The long run marginal expansion cost is increasing very 
fast because new hydro plants are ever more distant of consumption centers and environmental 
costs are difficult to mitigate. Thermal plants and other technologies, though increasing in 
importance, still have much higher prices. In case prices reflected marginal incremental costs, 
electricity prices would have been much higher. The fact that consumers do not see such high 
incremental costs, allow them to take wrong consumption decisions. As consumers are able to 
buy at prices lower than marginal cost, consumption levels go too far. Demand increases amplify 
the electricity market gap and reinforce the necessity of new investments.  
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1 - Introduction 
 
In the nineties, Brazilian electricity privatization program followed some rather conventional 
rules: separation of functions, generation, transmission, distribution and trade; concessions 
auctioned; competition in generation; price cap regulation for distribution and revenue cap for 
transmission; introduction of independent power producers and a centrally coordinated dispatch 
system.  
 
This model, inspired by the English, was ineffective mainly because new private investments in 
generation practically did not occur. The demand had grown by about 6% a year in the preceding 
40 years, and was not met by supply. In 2001there was a major crisis and consumption was 
rationed.  
 
Investments in generation did not take place because they were risky: in the early stages of the 
privatization program, new investors preferred to buy existing plants instead of building new 
ones. Brazilian government needed so much to increase supply that gave up divesting old plants, 
as originally planned, to favor interest in construction. This measure proved insufficient. Even 
when only new plants were auctioned, perceived risks continued to hinder new investments.  
 
Distributors were not willing to offer PPAs – Power Purchase Agreements to new investors 
because, in case of adequate rainfall, there would be much better energy buying opportunities in 
the spot market than backing the investments in a new plant. Energy acquisition costs could pass-
through but, in this case, prices in the concession area would be relatively higher when compared 
to other distributors. Therefore, existing plants traded off new thermo or hydro plants.  
 
Worse still, since energy acquisition costs could pass-through, and generation profits were not 
regulated, some distributors built their own plants to profit by means of self-dealing. These were 
not big projects because they were backed by only one distributor. They could mean extra profits 
for the utility, but could not solve the short supply national problem. 
 
Distributors were not the only ones to blame. New generators were not willing to compete in the 
spot market with big existing state producers with low generation costs. Even when distributors 
offered PPAs, this guarantee was not considered sufficient. New investments were also impaired 
by a clumsy environmental regulatory apparatus that did not support big projects in the Amazon 
basin. Finally, the necessary big projects could not be supported by isolated distribution utilities 
and consortiums had very high transaction costs.   
 
In 2004, in the beginning of the first president Lula mandate, a complete regulatory reform was 
launched.  In 2008, four years after, Brazilian Congress started an investigation of the causes of 
Brazilian relatively high electricity tariffs. The results of the investigation pointed out numerous 
reasons, but failed to identify generation costs as one of the main causes. The aim of this paper is 










This paper assesses the impact of distributors’ acquisition costs on tariffs. As the regulatory 
reform practically coincides with the end of the first round of tariff revisions after privatization, 
this assessment is done by comparing the results for each one of the 61 distribution utilities in the 
first round of tariff revisions to two other measures: 1) the second round of tariff revisions, i.e., 
the acquisition costs at the onset of the new regulatory model; and 2) the individual utilities´ 
projected costs for 2015 when the new model will be in full operation.
2 The year 2015 was 
chosen as the end of the forecast horizon since nearly 25% of all generation concessions will 
expire in 2015, with a major expected effect on the prevailing prices. Beyond 2015 (twenty years 
after the issuance of Law 9.074/95) all concessions will have to be re-auctioned and will not be 
eligible to automatic renewals anymore.  
 
The paper is structured as follows:  In section 2 we describe the regulatory reform; the results of 
the two first rounds of distribution tariff revisions are detailed in section 3; the analysis and 
forecast of the new model’s effects on the acquisition costs of energy is shown in section 4, and 
section 5 concludes the article.  
 
 
2 – The 2004 regulatory reform and energy auctions  
 
In 2004, the now prevailing regulatory model was launched. It was designed to mitigate the risks 
that curbed private investments. The main obstacles were removed and no contracts were broken. 
In the first place, government restarted central planning and now appoints the new projects to be 
auctioned. Utilities are no longer allowed to individually buy energy to supply their concession 
area. Government took the responsibility to buy in auctions all the energy necessary to attend 
their captive markets (approximately 75% of the total market). Big consumers, with the 
possibility of representing themselves, were given the option to deal in the free market. 
Presently, distributors need only inform their energy needs and the government is responsible for 
making the purchases and guaranteeing the overall equilibrium of demand and supply. 
Distributors may be punished in case they provide erroneous forecasts of their expected market. 
 
As energy acquisitions became centrally made by government through auctions run by CCEE – 
Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica, huge projects in the Amazon basin were made 
feasible with a relatively low demand risk because the production of each and every plant, either 
new or existent, would be sold to a pool of all distributors countrywide. Environmental risks 
were also mitigated because the previous licenses would be issued by government before the 
auctioning of new plants.  
 
One of the main concerns before the launch of the regulatory reform was the remarkable increase 
in the marginal cost of electricity production. Around 2001, with the rationing program, Brazil 
                                                            
2 The auctions´ database was extracted from the auctioneer’s homepage (CCEE – Câmara de Comercialização de 
Energia Elétrica), www.ccee.org.br. The tariff revisions’ database was built using the official documents on the 









strived to put new plants into operation using technologies different from its traditional 
hydroelectric plants (still 85% of total generation). Big new hydro plants became a second best 
because they would take too long to build and would have to be located in the Amazon region, 
requiring high transmission investments and environmental care. Also, big hydro plants could 
not be sponsored by a single Distribution Company; they demanded a pool of distributors to give 
economic support.  
 
Other technologies (thermal, wind, small hydro, biomass and others) were substantially more 
expensive and it was not easy to get new plants built to compete for the markets with such high 
price disadvantage. In case electricity market prices reflected marginal costs, there would be big 
profits for the state enterprises, which run almost all existing plants and practically no economic 
advantages to the new private investors. According to the Ministry of Mining and Energy, 
overall 2030 demand will be 134% to 244% higher than it was in 2005.
3 Supply has to 
correspond. 
 
Furthermore, electricity, together with other regulated prices, was an important component of 
core inflation and Brazilian Central Bank authorities follow the inflation target policy. Indeed, as 
electricity prices rise with the introduction of more costly technologies, inflation also rises. With 
higher core inflation, interest rates would also have to increase and Brazil already had one of the 
highest in the world. 
 
Government took the opportunity of regulatory reform to interfere in this increasing price trend. 
The idea was to abandon marginal costs and make energy prices reflect average costs instead. 
This would enable the combination of very high prices for the new energy while existing energy 
would be priced very low. Consumers would pay average prices and, therefore, would be unable 
to see the real price paid for the expansion.  
 
Auctions were separated into two segments with different rules and prices. Existing energy 
(almost exclusively generated by public enterprises) is traded at a lower price cap than that 
allowed for the new private projects. Consumers pay the average mix cost of all technologies and 
not the marginal cost. Figure 1 below shows the historical evolution of average “existent” 
(“almost all state”) energy auction prices and “new” (“almost all private”) ones in constant 2009 
reais.  
 
As may be observed, the difference between existent and new auction prices is narrowing. The 
first existing energy auctions had very low prices but, with time, prices increased. New energy 
prices experienced some reduction from 2012 on because of the auctioning of large Amazon 
hydro projects. In fact, in case these projects were implemented with the same technology used 
in Brazil in the sixties and seventies, their prices would have been even lower. But lately, 
environmental costs had to be reduced and this was done through a new technology that 
demanded much smaller dams, but also reduced productivity. 
                                                            
















As observed, existing energy is sold in auctions for a much lower price because auctions’ 
winners offer the biggest discounts relative to a specific price ceiling, which is fixed relatively 
low for existing plants. In the past, Brazilian citizens invested huge amounts of public money to 
get these projects done. Now, they are already paid for. The differences in existent and old 
energy prices are justified by the new projects necessities of capital expenditures. 
 
Table 1 next registers the results of auctions by segment, existing or new energy, from the start 
of the new regulatory framework until July 2010. Thermal plants, which include natural gas, 



















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AP Existent Energy (2009 R$) AP New Energy (2009 R$)
years
2009 R$ / MWh
Source: CCEE: Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica - www.ccee.org.br/ 










Table 1 – Auction Prices by Segment and Technology  
 
Auction Date Volume: MWh
AP: Current 
R$/MWh Technology Duration
634.938.912            57,5 Hydro 2005-8¹
475.608.096            67,3 Hydro 2006-8
82.190.016              75,5 Hydro 2007-8
2nd Auction of E.E. 02.04.2005 92.919.600              83,13 Hydro 2008-08
3rd Auction of E.E. 11.10.2005 2.683.008                62,95 Hydro 2006-03
4th Auction of E.E. 11.10.2005 81.769.248              94,91 Hydro 2009-08
5th Auction of E.E. 14.12.2006 14.306.112              104,74 Hydro 2007-08
TOTAL 1.384.414.992         66,38
Auction Date Volume: MWh AP: R$/MWhTechnology Duration
18.672.432              106,95 Hydro 2008-30
73.769.256              132,26 Thermo 2008-15
12.096.528              114,28 Hydro 2009-30
112.408.560            129,26 Thermo 2009-15
233.778.552            115,04 Hydro 2010-30
113.349.552            121,81 Thermo 2010-15
270.331.104            126,77 Hydro 2009-30
356.313.792            128,12 Thermo 2009-15
149.642.448            120,86 Hydro 2011-30
70.350.360              137,44 Thermo 2011-15
4th Auction of N.E. 26.07.2007 171.470.784            134,67 Thermo 2010-15
188.039.280            129,14 Hydro 2012-30
209.999.112            128,37 Thermo 2012-15
6th Auction of N.E. 17.09.2008 141.489.696            128,42 Fuel Oil/LNG 2011-15
31.819.128              98,98 Hydro 2013-30




Santo Antônio's Auction of N.10.12.2007 379.236.146            78,87 Hydro 2012-30
Jirau's Auction of N.E. 19.05.2008 348.649.463            71,37 Hydro 2013-30
Belo Monte's Auction of N.E.20.04.2010 794.925.103            77,97 Hydro 2015-30
10th Auction of N.E. 30.07.2010 85.998.384              99,48 Hydro 2015-30
TOTAL 4.157.281.567         109,30
SCB: Sugar Cane Bagasse




1st Auction of N.E. 16.12.2005
2nd Auction of N.E.
EXISTING ENERGY AUCTIONS
1st Auction of E.E. 07.12.2004
The "adjust auctions" were not included in the analysis, as they involve small energy amounts and have short 
duration.
1) Contracts starting in 2005 with 8 years duration
Source: Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica (CCEE) www.ccee.org.br
29.06.2006
3rd Auction of N.E. 10.10.2006
5th Auction of N.E. 16.10.2007









Lower energy acquisition costs, as aimed by government, would be achieved through several 
measures. The first and foremost is the lower-tariff auction mechanism.  Second, immediately 
after the auctions, which take place three to five years before the initial delivery of energy, a long 
run PPA (Power Purchase Agreement) is signed between the generator and the distributors’ pool. 
These PPAs bear such low risks that may be used as guarantees in the related financial 
operations for the plant´s construction, lowering its financial cost.  
 
Third, the new model does not allow self-dealing. Deverticalization and the ban of self-dealing 
adversely affected integrated utilities that had privileged access to existent plants forcing them to 
share these resources with the pool. On the other hand, the burden of Itaipu with its US-dollar 
indexed prices was also moved to the pool.
4 This is also the case of the expensive new projects. 
Since PPAs have terms up to 30 years, the long-term effects of these regulatory changes are 
rather permanent.  
 
 
3 – Two Rounds of Tariff Revisions 
 
Distribution price-cap regulatory model was brought into the scene by privatization. As widely 
recognized, the fact that Brazil started its privatization program before the approval of a 
regulatory framework increased the risk of the first investors.  
 
The first distribution companies to be privatized received a concession contract with a price cap 
and had to live with rules on the making.  The regulatory interval of around four or five years 
was believed sufficient to bring about substantial decreases in end consumers’ prices because 
state enterprises were highly inefficient. This hope did not materialize by the end of the first 
regulatory period or even by the end of the second. Brazilian society wondered why. 
 
Table 2 next registers the energy acquisition costs of all 61 Brazilian electricity distributors: 
They averaged R$105,5 for the first round of tariff revisions (2003-2005) and R$ 101,7 for the 
second regulatory period (2007-2009), when expressed in 2009 reais. Thus, acquisition costs 










4 Itaipu US$ indexed prices may be a curse or a blessing depending on the exchange rate. This is the only plant 























bought in the test 
year - MWh
Acquisition 







bought in the test 
year - MWh
AES SUL 123.0 Apr-03 8,065,588 100.0 Apr-08 8,448,709
AMPLA / CERJ  107.0 Dec-03 9,746,809 98.8 Mar-09 10,914,084
BANDEIRANTE 113.9 Oct-03 10,495,816 100.8 Oct-07 9,723,920
BOA VISTA 146.8 Nov-05 491,666 150.2 Nov-09 605,483
CAIUA 97.3 Feb-04 913,764 97.1 May-08 1,124,405
CEAL 75.4 Aug-05 2,874,862 82.4 Aug-09 3,160,050
CEB  106.3 Aug-04 4,104,785 103.6 Aug-08 5,650,767
CEEE 114.2 Oct-04 7,434,912 99.1 Oct-08 8,612,440
CELESC 117.0 Aug-04 15,297,715 111.8 Aug-08 16,562,255
CELG 88.0 Sep-05 8,912,235 90.9 Sep-09 10,516,473
CELPA 70.6 Aug-03 4,925,115 79.1 Aug-07 7,133,068
CELPE 109.7 Apr-05 9,551,788 109.7 Apr-09 11,482,549
CELTINS 70.4 Jul-04 1,065,135 120.8 Apr-08 1,459,860
CEMAR 73.0 Aug-05 3,983,384 82.8 Aug-09 5,081,612
CEMAT 106.1 Apr-03 4,052,839 124.7 Apr-08 5,581,920
CEMIG 93.4 Apr-03 38,150,971 91.8 Apr-08 27,402,852
CEPISA 79.6 Aug-05 2,523,129 84.2 Aug-09 2,864,059
CERON 113.0 Nov-05 2,191,271 104.5 Nov-09 2,630,273
CFLO 102.0 Feb-04 215,202 111.5 Feb-08 245,030
CHESP 116.0 Sep-04 61,253 77.2 Sep-08 91,829
CNEE / NACIONAL 96.6 Feb-04 426,075 96.4 May-08 531,767
COCEL 102.3 Mar-04 198,990 96.6 Jun-08 231,936
COELBA 87.8 Apr-03 10,989,683 95.7 Apr-08 14,940,301
COELCE 96.7 Apr-03 7,055,703 115.3 Apr-07 7,712,889
COOPERALIANÇA 50.4 Feb-06 129,957 123.8 Aug-09 168,215
COPEL 108.4 Jun-04 20,104,583 86.2 Jun-08 22,799,977
COSERN 76.0 Apr-03 3,504,917 89.4 Apr-08 4,351,252
CPFL  PAULISTA 118.9 Apr-03 21,329,677 114.8 Apr-08 22,574,352
CPFL  PIRATININGA 120.3 Oct-03 11,359,582 114.4 Oct-07 9,322,400
CPFL  SANTA CRUZ / CLFSC 68.3 Feb-04 808,854 97.2 Feb-08 962,309
CPFL JAGUARI / CJE 96.0 Feb-04 442,664 93.5 Feb-08 544,135
CPFL LESTE PAULISTA / CPEE 104.8 Feb-04 309,189 88.1 Feb-08 330,495
CPFL MOCOCA / CLFM 110.0 Feb-04 195,859 108.4 Feb-08 215,478
CPFL RGE 123.7 Apr-03 7,194,587 125.0 Apr-08 8,210,940
CPFL SUL PAULISTA / CSPE 98.4 Feb-04 398,146 98.3 Feb-08 422,010
DEMEI 97.8 Jun-05 98,520 118.5 Jun-09 112,364
DMEPC 71.6 Jun-04 337,649 80.9 Jun-08 407,371
EEB 95.0 Feb-04 747,016 106.7 May-08 675,730
EEVP / PARANAPANEMA 104.7 Feb-04 671,304 102.0 Feb-08 767,417
EFLJC 114.0 Mar-04 14,949 156.7 Mar-08 11,075
EFLUL 117.8 Mar-04 54,630 136.2 Mar-08 64,354
ELEKTRO 103.6 Aug-03 11,549,684 86.0 Aug-07 11,410,959
ELETROACRE 139.2 Nov-05 679,695 101.4 Nov-09 859,025
ELETROCAR 103.4 Jun-05 153,527 126.8 Jun-09 166,492
ELETROPAULO 120.4 Jul-03 37,732,090 107.5 Jul-07 38,686,118
ELFSM 119.3 Feb-04 317,690 94.0 Feb-08 398,777
ENERGISA-BO / CELB 95.4 Feb-05 536,827 97.3 Feb-09 637,247
ENERGISA-MG / CFLCL / CATAGUAZES 139.4 Jun-04 1,117,236 132.0 Jun-08 1,216,321
ENERGISA-NF / CENF 102.4 Jun-04 330,291 84.8 Jun-08 326,000
ENERGISA-PB / SAELPA 89.2 Aug-05 2,889,436 88.2 Aug-09 3,467,280
ENERGISA-SE / ENERGIPE / ESDE 75.7 Apr-03 2,252,630 87.5 Apr-08 2,330,210
ENERSUL 94.5 Apr-03 3,492,451 97.3 Apr-08 3,959,127
ESCELSA 104.5 Aug-04 5,839,726 93.0 Aug-07 6,206,343
FORCEL 95.7 Aug-04 24,294 83.2 Aug-08 36,107
HIDROPAN 107.7 Jun-05 81,098 129.3 Jun-09 90,855
IENERGIA 67.9 Aug-04 163,461 116.6 Aug-08 232,177
LIGHT 100.0 Nov-03 25,289,726 100.6 Nov-08 25,529,712
MANAUS ENERGIA / CEAM / MESA 115.6 Nov-05 4,973,276 149.3 Nov-09 5,799,617
MUXENERGIA 102.8 Jun-05 35,893 149.2 Jun-09 45,786
SULGIPE 102.7 Dec-04 245,475 86.3 Dec-08 296,837
UHENPAL 124.9 Dec-05 56,748 91.0 Apr-09 67,502
Average 101.42 104.37
Weighted Average 105.54 101.71
Source: ANEEL Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica homepage. Tariff Revisions Technical Notes.










The cost of the energy purchased is not the only determinant of final consumer prices, but is the 
most important one. Acquisition costs did not fall in the passage of the first to the second round 
of tariff revisions because new investments had to be made at increasing marginal costs. The fact 
that the acquisition costs did not rise resulted from the decision to subsidize the new projects 
with the existing ones and also to equate prices to average instead of marginal costs.  
 
In the first tariff revision period auctions were a very small portion (5%) of the total energy 
purchased. However, in the second, the importance of auctions was much bigger (52%) as 
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. In the future, energy purchases to supply captive consumers will be 
made only through auctions and Itaipu. The new big plants of the Amazon basin will be in 
operation and hence the current relative importance of Itaipu will decrease.  
 
Figure 2 – Acquisition Costs in the First Round of Tariff Revisions 2003-2005 
 
 
Initial and bilateral contracts  prevailed before the new regulatory model  
Parts do not sum exactly 100% due to errors and omissions 












Figure 3 – Acquisition Costs in the Second Round of Tariff Revisions 2003-2005 
 
 
Parts do not sum exactly 100% due to errors and omissions 
Source: ANEEL Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica homepage. Tariff Revisions Technical Notes.  
 
 
One of the main consequences of this model is the convergence of acquisition costs all over the 
country. Distributors that used to have lower acquisition costs because of verticalization or any 
other privileged access to low cost plants will have to share these advantages with all other 
distributors as their old contracts expire. On the other hand, the very expensive alternative 
technologies are diluted in the pool cost. Distributors that used to have high acquisition costs will 
witness a decrease. 
 
Figure 4 shows the change in acquisition costs experienced by distributors in the passage of the 
















Figure 4 – Percentual Change in Acquisition Costs between the First and the Second 





As expected, approximately half of all distributors experienced a rise in their acquisition costs 
and the other half a fall. Those in the extreme positions, suffered major changes, which were 
reflected in their final concession area prices. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the relative position of 
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In the near future, acquisitions costs will be almost the same in almost all concession areas. The 
isolated systems (concessions in the North of Brazil, in the Amazon region) may be the 
exceptions. This process of convergence has already started,as ilustrated in Figure 7, where we 
can see the increasing concentration around the average. The figure advances the subject of the 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 - Effects of the new regulatory model on acquisition costs 
 
Since 2004, distributors have been buying in auctions the energy necessary to supply their 
captive markets. So far, approximately 80%
5 of the total energy required in 2015 has already 
been contracted in auctions. Figure 8 below indicates 2013 as the year when acquisition costs 
will be higher than the ones prevailing in the first two rounds of tariff revisions. By then, there 
will start a rising pressure on final consumers’ prices coming from energy costs of acquisition. In 
Figure 8, the line representing the tariff revisions is extended into the future only as a basis of 
comparison. Of course, these values were obtained in the past and will change in the third round 
of tariff revisions which have only started. The line representing the costs of acquisition is the 
result of the calculus of the weighted average of all auction prices already contracted to be paid 
by every utility operating in Brazil.  For easier comparison all values are expressed in 2009 reais. 
 
                                                            
5 This estimation was done considering 336.410.897 MWh as the total distribution market in 2007 (The central year 
in the second tariff revisions round). This amount is the sum of the energy reported by each of the 61 concession 
utilities in their second tariff revision.  The captive market represents roughly 75% of this amount. The result of this 



















































Source: CCEE: Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica (www.ccee.org.br) 














This effect of cost acquisition increases on final prices in 2013 will partially depend on the 
renewal of the contracts of existing energy sold in the first auction of existing energy. In case 
blocks sold maintain their prices the new acquisition costs will drive final consumers prices 
down as ilustrated in Figure 9. 
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Average tariff - Tariff revision. R$ 2009 AP / Year years
2009 R$/MWh
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5 – Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the reasons why Brazilian 
electricity prices did not fall substantially after almost ten years of price cap regulation. Brazilian 
congress investigation appointed various causes but failed to identify energy production costs. 
This paper evaluates and quantifies the impact of distributors’ acquisition costs on tariffs. It 
starts by examining what were the individual acquisition costs of each one of the 61 electricity 
distribution companies operating in Brazil before the implementation of the new regulatory 
model (using their tariff revision processes as a database). Then, this number was compared to 
two others: their acquisition costs on the first round of tariff revisions after the implementation of 
the auctions; and the projection of their acquisition costs based on the purchases in the auctions 
until 2015. This time frame was chosen because 25% of all generation concessions expire in 
2015 with a major expected effect on the prevailing prices.  
 
The main conclusions are that the implementation of auctions together with subsidies from state 
enterprises did not reduce future acquisition costs as much as expected, but these measures 
successfully reduced the rhythm of price increases. The long run marginal expansion cost is 
increasing very fast because new hydro plants are ever more distant of consumption centers and 
environmental costs are difficult to mitigate. Thermal plants and other technologies, though 
increasing in importance, still have much higher prices. Were it not for the artificialities 
introduced by the 2004 regulatory model, price increases would be very high in the near future.  
 
In case prices reflected marginal incremental costs, electricity prices would have been much 
higher. The fact that consumers do not see such high incremental costs, allow them to take wrong 
consumption decisions. As consumers are able to buy at prices lower than marginal cost, 
consumption levels go too far. Demand increases amplify the electricity market gap and 
reinforce the necessity of new investments. 
 
It is interesting to remark that different distributors are not given exactly the same buying 
chances in this new regulatory model. At each auction, individual utilities buy only for those 
periods when energy is missing in their concession areas. In case the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy decides to make a new auction, purchases cannot be made to make “good deals” of 
reserve to the future or substitute for the purchases already made. Moreover, the Ministry does 
not publish the auctions schedule in advance so that utilities might not act strategically trying to 
optimize their purchases over time. Therefore, having a lower acquisition cost does not mean that 
the utility has superior managerial skills. It only means that the right auction (existent energy) 
was made on the right time (for the period when it was missing in that specific concession area). 
Utilities in the same economic group (the same management) frequently have different 
acquisitions costs in case the opportunities opened to them are different.  
 
The price reducing effect of subsidies will probably be reinforced in 2015 when many large 









have to be re-auctioned, but there has been much discussion on this matter, bringing instability to 
the electricity markets. This discussion is quite relevant and manifold. Brazilian government 
spent lots of public money in the past to get these projects built. Now that they are already paid 
for, the time is ripe to have them operating at a cost of only operational items. In case these 
projects be reauctioned, big state enterprises will lose their assets. 
 
Finally, long-term contracts like the ones offered today, reduce prices volatility favoring 
investments planning in industries or any other demanding electricity, but introduce rigidities 
because they cannot be changed. The energy offered by the state at lower prices is produced by 
state companies listed at the NYSE and São Paulo Stock Exchange. This raises questions 
regarding governance and responsibilities to shareholders. The maintenance of subsidies and 
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ANEEL - Tariff Revisions Technical Notes 
 
. AES SUL (Nota Técnica nº 047/ 2003; 101/2004 e 105/2008) 
. AMPLA/CERJ  (Nota Técnica nº 230 / 2003; 015/2004 e 072/2008) 
. BANDEIRANTE (Nota Técnica nº 183 / 2003; 315/2005 e 280/2007) 
. BOA VISTA  (Nota Técnica nº 277/2005; 333/2005 e 354/2009) 
. CAIUÁ (Nota Técnica nº 216 / 2003; 09/2005e 145/2008) 
. CEAL (Nota Técnica nº 189/2005; 253/2005 e  286/2009) 
.CEB (Nota Técnica nº 258/2005 e 244/2008) 
. CEEE (Nota Técnica nº 314/2005 e 315/2008) 
.CELESC (Nota Técnica nº 133 /2004 ; 224/2005 e  225/2008) 
.CELG  (Nota Técnica nº 198/2005; 272/2005 e 303/2009–SRE/ANEEL) 
.CELPA (Nota Técnica nº 119/ 2003;  074/2005 e 234/2007) 
.CELPE  (Nota Técnica nº 106/2005 e 144/2006 e nº 150/2009) 
.CELTINS (Nota Técnica nº 106/2004 ;185/2005e 199 /2008) 
.CEMAR  (Nota Técnica nº 186/2005; 256/2005e 287/2009 ) 
.CEMAT (Nota Técnica nº 042 / 2003; 097/2004 e  091/2008 ) 
.CEMIG  (Nota Técnica nº 040 / 2003; 103/2005 e  92/2008 ) 
.CEPISA (Nota Técnica nº 187/2005; 255/2005 e 292/2009) 
.CERON (Nota Técnica nº 284/2005; 351/2005 e 379/2009 ) 
.CFLO  (Nota Técnica nº 235/ 2003 ; 001/2005 e 026/2008) 
.CHESP (Nota Técnica nº 182/2004; 271/2005 e 263/2008 ) 
.CNEE (Nota Técnica nº 231/ 200;  02/2005 e 146 /2008 ) 
.COCEL (Nota Técnica nº 22 / 2004; 108/2004 e 185/2008 ) 
.COELBA (Nota Técnica nº 052/ 2003; 113/2005 e 115/2008 ) 
.COELCE  (Nota Técnica nº 049/ 2003; 110/2005 e  089/2007 ) 
.COOPERALIANÇA (Nota Técnica nº 336/2005; 026/2006 e 272 /2009) 
.COPEL (Nota Técnica nº 095/2004; 146/2004 e 184/2008 ) 
.COSERN (Nota Técnica nº 050/ 2003; 109/2005 e 131/2008) 
.CPFL-PAULISTA  (Nota Técnica nº 041 / 2003 ; 105/2005 e 089/2008) 
.CPFL  PIRATININGA (Nota Técnica nº 182 / 2003; nº 316/2005 e 279/2007) 
CPFL SANTA CRUZ / CLFSC (Nota Técnica nº 218 / 2003; 371/2005 e 022/2008) 
.CPFL JAGUARI / CJE  (Nota Técnica nº 228 / 2003 ; 008/2005 e  025/2008) 
.CPFL LESTE PAULISTA / CPEE  (Nota Técnica nº 232 / 2003;016/2005 e 024/2008) 
.CPFL MOCOCA / CLFM  (Nota Técnica nº 233 / 2003; 019/2005 e 028/2008) 
 .CPFL RGE  (Nota Técnica nº 048/2003;100/2004 e 108/2008)  
.CPFL SUL PAULISTA / CSPE (Nota Técnica nº 227 / 2003; 020/2005 e 023/2008) 
.DEMEI (Nota Técnica nº 130/2005; 178/2005 e 211/2009) 
.DMEPC (Nota Técnica nº 094/2004; 159/2005 e 193/2008) 
.EEB (Nota Técnica nº 229/ 2003; 003/2005e 144/2008) 
.EEVP (Nota Técnica nº 217 / 2003; 015/2005 e 147/2008) 
.EFLJC (Nota Técnica nº 020/2004; 129/2004 e  073/2008) 
.EFLUL(Nota Técnica nº 021 / 2004; 107/2004 e 074/2008)  
.ELEKTRO (Nota Técnica nº 127 / 2003; 204/2004 e 248/2007)  
.ELETROACRE( Nota Técnica nº 287/2005; 350 /2005 e 381/2009)  
.ELETROCAR (Nota Técnica nº 123/2005; 181/2005 e 210/2009)  
.ELETROPAULO (Nota Técnica nº 097 / 2003; 190/2005 e 184/2007) 
.ELFSM (Nota Técnica nº 236 / 2003; 372/2005 e 020/2008)  
.ENERGISA BO / CELB  (Nota Técnica nº 286/2004 ; 024/2005 e 043/2009) 
.ENERGISA MG / CFLCL (Nota Técnica nº 092/2004; 154/2005 e  181/2008)  
.ENERGISA-NF / CENF (Nota Técnica nº 093/2004; 159/2004 e 180/2008) 
.ENERGISA PB / SAELPA (Nota Técnica nº 188/2005; 257/2005 e 291/2009) 
.ENERGISA SE / ENERGIPE / ESDE (Nota Técnica nº 051/ 2003; 114/2005 e 110 /2008)  
.ENERSUL  (Nota Técnica nº 043/ 2003;104/2005 e 090/2008) 
.ESCELSA  (Nota Técnica nº 135/2004; 205/2004 e 233/2007) 
. FORCEL (Nota Técnica nº 144/2004; 232/2005 e 232/2008) 
.HIDROPAN (Nota Técnica nº 131/2005;175/2005 e 198/2008) 
.IENERGIA ( Nota Técnica nº 134/2004 ;nº 205/2005 e  226/2008) 
.LIGHT (Nota Técnica nº 188 / 2003; 259/2004 e 339/2008)  
.MANAUS (Nota Técnica nº 276/2005; 329/2005 e 355/2009) 
.MUXEENERGIA  (Nota Técnica nº 124/2005;183/2005 e197/2009) 
.SULGIPE  (Nota Técnica nº 236/2004;292/2004 e 366/2008)  
.UHENPAL ( Nota Técnica nº 337/2005 e 050/2009)  
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